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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : Case No. 990973-CA 
v. : 
JEFF CLAUDE REED, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellee. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE CASE 
The State of Utah appeals the trial court's dismissal of an information charging 
defendant with one count of possession of a controlled substance precursor and/or of 
laboratory equipment or supplies with the intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory 
operation, a first degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37d-4 (1998) and 58-37d-5 
(Supp. 1999). This Court has jurisdiction of the case in accordance with Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2a-3(2)(j)(1996). 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL, STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE BELOW 
Did the trial court err in quashing defendant's bindover and dismissing the 
possession charge where the preliminary hearing testimony showed that defendant 
knew how to make methamphetamine, that he planned to "throw a batch" soon, and 
that he had recently possessed certain controlled substance precursors? 
"'[T]he ultimate decision of whether to bind a defendant over for trial presents a 
question of law which we review de novo without deference.'" State v. Hutchings, 950 
P.2d 425, 429 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting State v. Jaeger, 896 P.2d 42,44 (Utah App. 
1995)). A trial court's ruling on a motion to quash presents a question of law reviewed 
for correctness, giving no particular deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. See 
State v. Taylor, 884 P.2d 1293, 1296 (Utah App. 1994). 
This issue was preserved below (R. 109-11; 137:7-9). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following dispositive statutes are attached at Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-4 (1998); 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-5 (Supp. 1999). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one count of possession of a controlled substance 
precursor and/or of laboratory equipment or supplies with the intent to engage in a 
clandestine laboratory operation, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 58-37d-4 (1998) and 58-37d-5 (Supp. 1999). Following a preliminary hearing, the 
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magistrate found probable cause and bound defendant over for trial (R. 136:64). 
Defendant then filed a motion in the district court to quash bindover (R. 103-08). After a 
hearing, the court granted the motion and dismissed the case (R. 122; Addendum B). The 
State filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 123). The Utah Supreme Court transferred the 
case to this Court for disposition (R. 134). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On Thanksgiving Day, 1998, defendant and Carol Peterson, whom he had just met, 
were at Carol's house with two other methamphetamine users, Lisa Taylor (who leased 
part of Carol's basement), and Lisa's boyfriend, Jay Williams (R. 136:41-42, 55, 58, 62-
63). Jay was "an A methamphetamine cook" and Lisa was very knowledgeable about 
methamphetamine ("meth") and chemicals (R. 136:55). Carol was a distributor (R. 
136:42). 
At one point during that Thanksgiving celebration, Carol gave Lisa and Jay 
permission to try to condense some meth oil down in Carol's bedroom (R. 136:63). 
Although "they didn't get anything out of it," defendant went into the bedroom later that 
day "to clean it up after and attempted to try to recondense it" (R. 136:63). 
Defendant moved in with Carol a short while later and shared her bedroom (R. 
136:9,42). At one point, he gave her an "eight ball" of meth (R. 136:49). He boasted to 
her that he knew how to make meth and that he had been involved in its production (R. 
136:10,43-44, 56). "He kept talking [to her] about wanting to throw a big batch" (R. 
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136:56). 
Both defendant and Carol then purchased some pseudoephedrine—a meth 
precursor—and Carol assumed defendant intended to use his to make meth (R. 136:12, 
44-45). Defendant told Carol he was also going to use some of the pseudoephedrine to 
repay a debt stemming from "the fact that he could not purchase iodine crystals" (R. 
136:45-46). Carol assumed defendant wanted the iodine to make the meth also (R. 
136:46). Defendant had visited a chemistry store recently to "check[] it out" (R. 136:13). 
Shortly after their purchases, Carol watched defendant in their bedroom as he put 
pseudoephedrine tablets in a bowl and added a solvent to them (R. 136:47-48). She also 
watched him rip the striker plates off of several matchbooks (R. 136:48). Both 
pseudoephedrine and the red phosphorous in striker plates from matchbooks are used in 
meth production (R. 136:36). According to Carol, the two were thinking of trying to set 
up Carol's ex-husband with the matches, which were eventually thrown away (R. 136:59-
61). Carol could not recall what happened to the pseudoephedrine but it "never made it to 
a lab" (R. 136:61). 
On December 16, 1998, officers executed a search warrant on Carol's home at 
7377 South 2290 West, West Jordan, Utah. (R. 136:5-7, 9). The house has three 
bedrooms and a living room upstairs and at least two bedrooms and a dining room 
downstairs (R. 136:6). The house is located within 500 feet of another residence (R. 
136:15). 
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When the officers entered the house, defendant, Carol, and Carol's 16-year-old son 
(who lived in one of the downstairs bedrooms) were in the living room (R. 136:6,28-29). 
A search of the house revealed a heating element, two glass beakers, some tubing, and a 
grinder used for grinding pseudoephedrine (R. 136:8). Plexiglass tubing, rubber 
reinforced tubing, Pyrex cookware, duct tape, pseudoephedrine, a heating device, two 
flasks (one with a condenser column), a solvent, jars for storage, funnels, a frying pan, 
meth, and meth residue were found in the downstairs bedroom rented by Lisa and Jay (R. 
136:27, 29-30, 33-36). All of these items are associated with a meth lab, and defendant 
knew that a meth lab was being operated down there (R. 136:8, 10,23, 33). 
Proceedings Below 
On December 22, 1998, defendant was charged with one count of possession of a 
controlled substance precursor and/or of laboratory equipment or supplies with the intent 
to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation, a first degree felony, under Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 58-37d-4 (1998) and 58-37d-5 (Supp. 1999) (R. 3-5). Two of the officers who 
conducted the search on Carol Peterson's home testified at defendant's preliminary 
hearing (R. 136:4-6, 31-33). Carol also testified, pursuant to an agreement with the State 
under which the charges against her would be significantly reduced (R. 136:38-40,49-
52). Based on this testimony, defendant was bound over for trial (R. 136:64). 
On July 21,1999, defendant filed a Motion to Quash Bind Over and Memorandum 
in Support (R. 103-08). In it, defendant argued that the downstairs lab was, "of course," 
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the subject of the charges brought against defendant and that, "[w]hile facts viewed in the 
light most favorable to the State suggest that Mr. Reed may well have been involved in 
other criminal offenses and even other methamphetamine lab offenses, the State produced 
no evidence linking him to the lab in Ms. Peterson's home" (R. 104,107,113,115). 
After reading "parts of the preliminary hearing transcripts," the trial court held a 
hearing on defendant's motion (R. 137:1). Defendant again argued that "there really is 
not an established link between Mr. Reed and the lab that was alleged to have been 
operated at that home" (R. 137:1). In making that argument, defendant conceded that 
"the State certainly points to evidence which would, you would conceive raise perhaps 
probable cause that Mr. Reed has been involved in a line of activities at some location" 
(R. 137:1-2). Defendant further argued that, because "at least there isn't any new 
evidence that's been provided to us in discovery that contradicts whait happened at the 
preliminary hearing" and because defendant was likely "to try this case to the bench," the 
question for the court was "whether or not there is beyond a reasonable doubt evidence 
based on the preliminary hearing testimony" (R. 137:3). 
As the State began to respond, the court explained: "[T]his is the trouble in part to 
me We're talking about a charge that involves specific activity in this home; 
production of methamphetamine" (R. 137:4-5). The court acknowledged defendant's 
knowledge of the lab downstairs and defendant's knowledge of how to make meth (R. 
137:4-5). It also acknowledged that defendant at one point did have and prepare meth 
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precursors (R. 137:5). Nonetheless, the court asked: 
Well, then, where's the connection? I mean I don't 
have any evidence that connects him to anything other than 
the fact that you list off a bunch of stuff. Admitted 
knowledge of a method used to produce methamphetamine. 
That has nothing to do with the charge that I can see. That the 
defendant admitted patronizing a chemistry store. I don't 
know that that has anything to do with the production of 
methamphetamine as charged. That the defendant admitted to 
Carol Petersen that he was involved in the production of 
methamphetamine and I read that testimony and she said, 
"Yeah, he told me he'd done it and I don't know where." 
And so on and so forth. It had nothing to do with the 
production going on in her home. That the defendant told 
Carol Petersen that he planned to manufacture 
methamphetamine. Well, maybe he planned to but what does 
that have to do with the charge pending? . . . 
. . . He planned to procure iodine and she accompanied 
him when he bought some pseudoephedrine. So what? 
But the charge is that at 7377 South 2290 West in Salt Lake 
County on or about December 16 Mr. Reed was a party to this 
plan lab operation. Where's the proof? 
(R. 137:6-7). When the State responded that, "[a]t this stage of the proceeding the State 
doesn't have to have proof," (R. 137:7), the following discourse took place: 
THE COURT: You have to come close. And I don't even 
think you're close. 
MR. MERCER: Well, your Honor, -
THE COURT: You caught the guy in the house. 
MR. MERCER: Are you going to want me to argue? 
THE COURT: No, Mr. Mercer, look. Don't give me this 
crap. Please don't. I'll let you make your record, okay? But 
you're not answering the questions. 
MR. MERCER: You won't allow me to. You keep speaking 
every time that I speak. 
THE COURT: Well, I know because I can't quite figure out 
where you're coming from. 
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(R. 137:7-8). The State argued: 
What we have is a defendant who holds himself out as a 
methamphetamine cook. We have a lab located in a house 
that he is claiming as his residence. We have him bringing to 
that house ephedrine and processing that in the method 
necessary to reduce it to a substance used to make 
methamphetamine in the same house where the clandestine 
lab is found. I submit that that alone is sufficient to find 
probable cause to warrant this case going to trial. 
(R. 137:8-9). Defendant, however, renewed his argument that such evidence was 
insufficient absent physical evidence connecting defendant to the downstairs lab: "There 
is not any link between Mr. Reed and the involvement at that location on the time that's 
charged'9 (R. 137:9-10). 
The court concluded: "I don't see a connection, the motion is granted Mr. 
Mercer, I apologize for interrupting you. That was not fair" (R. 137:12-13). 
A transcript of this hearing is attached at Addendum C. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
As is clear from the transcript of the hearing on defendant's motion to quash, the 
trial court misinterpreted the offense with which defendant was charged to require proof 
of actual involvement in a clandestine laboratory. Actual involvement in a clandestine 
lab is not an element of that offense. All that is required is an intent - a future objective -
to engage in such a lab. The evidence produced at defendant's preliminary hearing was 
sufficient to establish that intent under the standard set forth in State v. Talbot, 972 P.2d 
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435 (Utah 1998). Thus, the trial court erred in granting defendant's motion to quash, and 
this Court should reinstate the information filed against defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO QUASH WHERE THE EVIDENCE WAS 
SUFFICIENT UNDER TALBOT TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE 
CAUSE THAT DEFENDANT POSSESSED EITHER A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE PRECURSOR OR EQUIPMENT 
WITH THE INTENT TO ENGAGE IN A CLANDESTINE 
LABORATORY OPERATION 
The trial court granted defendant's motion to quash in this case because, according 
to the court, the State had failed to establish a sufficient connection between defendant 
and the meth lab located in the downstairs portion of his home (R. 137:5-7, 11-12). In 
reaching that conclusion, the court erroneously concluded that actual involvement in a 
clandestine lab is an element of the offense with which defendant was charged. The 
evidence adduced at defendant's preliminary hearing was sufficient to establish the 
elements of the offense as set forth in Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37d-4 (1998) and 58-37d-5 
(Supp. 1999). 
A. Because actual involvement in a clandestine lab is not an 
element of the offense with which defendant was charged, 
the trial court erred in requiring the State to establish an 
actual physical connection between defendant and the lab 
located in his home 
The trial court erred in granting defendant's motion to quash because, contrary to 
the trial court's understanding, a connection between defendant and an actual clandestine 
9 
lab is not an element of the crime with which defendant was charged,. 
A trial court's statutory interpretation is reviewed for correctness. See State v. 
Spainhower, 1999 UT App. 280 \ 4, 988 P.2d 452. "When faced with a question of 
statutory construction, [this Court] look[s] first to the plain language of the statute." 
Stephens v. Bonneville Travel Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 520 (Utah 1997) (citation omitted); see 
also State v. Harley, 1999 UT App. 197 Tf 10, 982 P.2d 1145, cert denied, No. 990822 
(Utah Dec. 20, 1999). 
The statute under which defendant was charged provides, in relevant part: 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to knowingly or 
intentionally: 
(a) possess a controlled substance precursor with 
the intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory 
operation; 
(b) possess laboratory equipment or supplies with 
the intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory 
operation[.] 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-4 (1998) (emphasis added). 
Thus, the elements of this offense are: 
(1) that defendant 
(2) knowingly or intentionally 
(3) possessed a controlled substance precursor or possessed laboratory 
equipment or supplies 
(4) with an intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation. 
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See id. 
In State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878 (Utah 1981), the Utah Supreme Court discussed 
the element of intent under Utah's burglary statute. After noting that the requisite intent 
for burglary is the intent to commit a felony, theft, or assault, the court held that "[i]t is 
the intent to commit a theft, and not the actual theft, which is material." Id. at 881. Thus, 
"the failure to find an appropriate object to steal... is no defense to the crime." Id. 
Brooks is dispositive here. Under section 58-37d-4, "[i]t is the intent to [engage in 
a clandestine laboratory operation], and not the actual [clandestine laboratory operation], 
which is material." Id. Thus, the failure to directly connect defendant with an actual 
clandestine lab is no defense to the crime with which defendant was charged. See id. 
Consequently, the trial court erred in granting defendant's motion to quash on that 
basis. 
B. Because the evidence presented at defendant's 
preliminary hearing was sufficient under Talbot to 
establish probable cause that defendant committed the 
crime with which he was charged, the trial court erred in 
granting defendant's motion 
In granting defendant's motion to quash, the trial court misinterpreted the offense 
with which defendant was charged to include as an element actual involvement in a 
clandestine laboratory. As explained above, this offense does not include such an 
element. See pp. 9-11 herein. Under sections 58-37d-4 and 58-37d-5 as correctly 
interpreted, the evidence presented at defendant's preliminary hearing was sufficient to 
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sustain the magistrate's bindover. 
In State v. Talbot, 972 P.2d 435 (Utah 1998), a unanimous Utah Supreme Court 
defined the standard of proof applicable at preliminary hearings. "[T]he prosecution must 
present evidence sufficient for the magistrate to find '[pjrobable cause to believe that the 
crime charged has been committed and that the defendant has committed it.'" Talbot, 972 
P.2d at 437 (quoting State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Utah 1995) (additional 
internal quotation omitted)). However, "[tjhis probable cause standard 'is lower, even, 
than a preponderance of the evidence standard applicable to civil cases.'" Id. (quoting 
Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229). Thus, "'[t]he prosecution is not required to introduce 
enough evidence to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Id. 
(quoting Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229) (additional citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). Rather, it need only "'present a quantum of evidence sufficient to warrant 
submission of the case to the trier of fact.'" Id. (quoting Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229) 
(additional citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Furthermore, "in determining whether this standard of probable cause has been 
satisfied, 'the magistrate should view the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
prosecution and resolve all inferences in favor of the prosecution.'" Talbot, 972 P.2d at 
437-38 (quoting Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229). 4"[U]nless the evidence is wholly lacking 
and incapable of reasonable inference to prove some issue which supports the 
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[prosecution's] claim,' the magistrate should bind the defendant over for trial." Pledger, 
896 P.2d at 1229 (quoting Cruz v. Montoya, 660 P.2d 723, 729 (Utah 1983)). "[T]he 
assumption is that the prosecution's case will only get stronger as the investigation 
continues." Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177,182 (Utah 1998) (citing Pledger, 896 P.2d at 
1229). 
In this case, defendant was charged with one count of possession of a controlled 
substance precursor and/or of laboratory equipment or supplies with the intent to engage 
in a clandestine laboratory operation, a first degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. §§58-
37d-4 (1998) and 58-37d-5 (Supp. 1999). Based on the information filed, the State had 
to establish the following elements at defendant's preliminary hearing: 
(1) That defendant 
(2) knowingly or intentionally 
(3) possessed a controlled substance precursor 
or possessed laboratory equipment or supplies 
(4) with the intent to engage in a clandestine 
laboratory operation, and 
(5) either the intended laboratory operation was 
to take place or did take place within 500 feet of 
a residence, place of business, church, or 
school; or the clandestine laboratory operation 
actually produced any amount of a specified 
controlled substance; or the intended 
clandestine laboratory operation was for the 
production of cocaine base or 
methamphetamine base. 
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(R. 3-5). The evidence presented at defendant's preliminary hearing, when viewed, as it 
must be under Talbot, in a light most favorable to the prosecution and with all inferences 
resolved in favor of the prosecution, established: 
(1) that defendant was a meth user, as were the 
other members of his household (R. 136:42); 
(2) that he had been involved in the production of 
meth and boasted about knowing how to make it 
(136:43-44); 
(3) that he had recently given Carol Peterson, one 
of his house-mates, an "eight ball" of meth (R. 
136:9,49). 
(4) that he had recently attempted to condense some 
meth oil down in Carol's bedroom (R. 136:63); 
(5) that he "kept talking about wanting to throw a 
big batch" of meth soon (R. 136:44, 56); 
(6) that he had recently purchased pseudoephedrine 
and was planning to acquire iodine 
crystals—both of which are meth precursors, 
see State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98 ^  7, 989 P.2d 
1065—for that purpose (R. 136:36, 44-46); 
(7) that he had recently visited a chemistry store to 
"check[] it out" (R. 136:13); 
(8) that he had recently mixed pseudoephedrine 
tablets with a solvent and separated striker 
plates from several matchbooks, both processes 
used in making meth (R. 136:36,47-48); 
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(9) that the striker plates were subsequently thrown 
away but that Carol recalled only that the 
pseudoephedrine "never made it to a lab" (R. 
136:61); 
(10) that a search on December 16,1998, of 
defendant's residence revealed plexiglass 
tubing, rubber reinforced tubing, Pyrex 
cookware, duct tape, pseudoephedrine, a heating 
device, two flasks (one with a condenser 
column), a solvent, jars for storage, funnels, and 
a frying pan,—all of which are associated with a 
meth lab—in the downstairs portion of the 
house (R. 136:8,29-30, 32-36); 
(11) that some "finished product" was also found 
(R. 136:35); 
(12) that defendant was aware of and had access to 
the meth lab (R. 136:10, 23, 42); and 
(13) that the lab was located within 500 feet of 
another residence (R. 15). 
Because this evidence establishes each of the elements of the crime with which 
defendant was charged, this evidence is "sufficient to warrant submission of the case to 
the trier of fact." Talbot, 972 P.2d at 437 (citation omitted). Even if the trial court was 
correct in requiring proof of a connection between defendant and the meth lab operating 
in his home, the evidence is not so "wholly lacking and incapable of reasonable inference 
to prove" that connection. Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229 (citation omitted). 
Thus, the trial court erred in granting defendant's motion. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
the trial court's quashal of the bindover and reinstate the information. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / ^ day of March 2000 
JAN GRAHAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
KAREN A. KLUCZl^K 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this, / /^dav of March 2000,1 mailed, postage prepaid, 
four accurate copies of the foregoing Appellant's Brief to Steven G. Shapiro, Salt Lake 
Legal Defender Association, 424 East 500 South #300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
COUJL~ 8. P^u QUJL* 
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ADDENDA 
Addendum A 
58-37d-4. Prohibited acts — Second degree felony. 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally: 
(a) possess a controlled substance precursor with the intent to engage 
in a clandestine laboratory operation; 
(b) possess laboratory equipment or supplies with the intent to engage 
in a clandestine laboratory operation; 
(c) sell, distribute, or otherwise supply a precursor chemical, laboratory 
equipment, or laboratory supplies knowing or having reasonable cause to 
believe it will be used for a clandestine laboratory operation; 
(d) evade recordkeeping provisions of Title 58, Chapter 37c, Controlled 
Substances Precursor Act, or the regulations issued under that act, 
knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the material distrib-
uted or received will be used for a clandestine laboratory operation; 
(e) conspire with or aid another to engage in a clandestine laboratory 
operation; 
(f) produce or manufacture, or possess with intent to produce or 
manufacture a controlled or counterfeit substance except as authorized 
under Title 58, Chapter 37, Utah Controlled Substances Act; or 
(g) transport or convey a controlled or counterfeit substance with the 
intent to distribute or to be distributed by the person transporting or 
conveying the controlled or counterfeit substance or by any other person 
regardless of whether the final destination for the distribution is within 
this state or any other location. 
(2) A person who violates any provision of Subsection (1) is guilty of a second 
degree felony. 
58-37d-5. Prohibited acts — First degree felony. 
(1) A person who violates Subsection 58-37d-4(l)(a), (b), (e), or (f) is guilty of 
a first degree felony if the trier of fact also finds any one of the following 
conditions occurred in conjunction with that violation: 
(a) possession of a firearm; 
(b) use of a booby trap; 
(c) illegal possession, transportation, or disposal of hazardous or dan-
gerous material or while transporting or causing to be transported 
materials in furtherance of a clandestine laboratory operation, there was 
created a substantial risk to human health or safety or a danger to the 
environment; 
(d) intended laboratory operation was to take place or did take place 
within 500 feet of a residence, place of business, church, or school; 
(e) any phase of the clandestine laboratory operation or production or 
manufacture of a controlled or counterfeit substance involved or was 
conducted in the presence of a person less than 18 years of age; 
(f) clandestine laboratory operation actually produced any amount of a 
specified controlled substance; or 
(g) intended clandestine laboratory operation was for the production of 
cocaine base or methamphetamine base. 
(2) If the trier of fact finds that two or more of the conditions listed in 
Subsections (l)(a) through (g) of this section occurred in conjunction with the 
violation, at sentencing for the first degree felony: 
(a) probation shall not be granted; 
(b) the execution or imposition of sentence shall not be suspended; and 
(c) the court shall not enter a judgment for a lower category of offense. 
History: C. 1953, 58-37d-5, enacted by L. conducted in the presence oF after "involved* in 
1992, ch. 156, § 5; 1997, ch. 64, § 12; 1998, Subsection (lXe). 
ch. 65, § 1. Cross-References. — Sentencing for felo-
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend-
 nies, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-203, 76-3-301. 
ment, effective May 4, 1998, inserted "or was 
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STEVEN G. SHAPIRO (6330) 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE pF UTAH 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JEFF CLAUDE REED, 
Defendant. 
ORDER TO DISMISS 
Case No. 981925686FS 
JUDGE WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
This matter, having come before the Court on Defendant's 
Motion to Quash Bindover and said Motion having been granted: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-entitled matter is hereby 
dismissed. 
DATED this day of October, 1999. 
BY THE COURT: 
v 
JUDGE WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Third District Court 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the County 
Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Suite 300, Utah 84111, this 
day of October, 1999. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
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JEFF CLAUDE REED, 
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For the Defendant: STEPHEN G. SHAPIRO 
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424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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October 19, 1999 
HONORABLE WILLIAM W. BARRETT PRESIDING 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Okay, this is the State of Utah versus 
Jeff Claude Reed. Case Number 981925686. Mr. Shapiro, is 
your client here? 
MR. SHAPIRO: Yes, he is. 
THE COURT: This is Mr. Shapiro's motion to quash 
the bind over on behalf of his client, Mr. Reed. So, go 
ahead. The floor is yours. 
MR. SHAPIRO: Judge, I presume that you've seen 
the pleadings that have been filed in this matter? 
THE COURT: Yes. I've read parts of the 
transcript, too. 
MR. SHAPIRO: Pardon? 
THE COURT: I read parts of the preliminary 
hearing transcripts too. 
MR. SHAPIRO: And I think that our position has 
been put forth in the reply memorandum. It's probably been 
put forth fifteen or eighteen different times, about the 
same way each time. And this case is an unusual one in 
that there really is not an established link between Mr. 
Reed and the lab that was alleged to have been operated at 
that home. And while the State certainly points to 
evidence which would, you would conceive raise perhaps 
1 probable cause that Mr. Reed has been involved in a line of 
2 activities at some location. I simply don't think that 
3 there is a connection that's been made to that address and 
4 particularly I think that this case is unusual because of 
5 the posture in which it since sits and that is it would 
6 appear from all evidence that we have that Mr. Reed is 
7 likely the least involved of any of the players in this 
8 case. Yet/ he is the only one who is standing trial on the 
9 charge and the person who is likely most involved or 
10 certainly one of the most involved, the owner of the home, 
11 is the witness for the State and she says quite clearly on 
12 a handful of different occasions, she doesn't believe that 
13 Jeff was involved with operations at that particular 
14 location. 
15 Now while she may have said things that would 
16 suggest his knowledge of live operations in other locations 
17 she clearly says that there, that she has no knowledge of 
18 him being involved at that time. I think we have to give 
19 her testimony some tremendous credibility in this case 
20 because she had absolutely everything to gain by telling 
21 the truth and nothing to loose by lying. She was sitting 
22 there charged with the possible (inaudible) lab and with 
23 some other charges hanging over her, she was (inaudible) in 
24 possession of methamphetamine at the time that about the 
25 search warrant was issued. She is the owner of a home 
where a lab is found. They had plenty of evidence against 
her and they offered her a drug course deal on a 
(inaudible) case which as you know is something which you'd 
have to bend the rules in order to get it assigned that 
case in the drug court to start with. Here she is looking 
at the possibility of having this case, for all intensive 
purposes dismissed, against her, at least a plea in 
abeyance, to a significantly lessor offense and she comes 
up and says, I don't believe Jeff has been involved with 
operations at that house. I think that there is a gate 
keeping function that this Court needs to engage in and I 
think that that would, for all the evidence we've seen is 
going to prohibit this case from going forward. 
You can imagine a situation where there is no 
evidence other than that which was presented at the 
preliminary hearing or at least there isn't any new 
evidence that's been provided to us in discovery that 
contradicts what happened at the preliminary hearing. If 
we go forward to trial the likelihood is that we're just 
going to try this case to the bench and it will be your 
decision to decide whether or not there is beyond a 
reasonable doubt evidence based on the preliminary hearing 
testimony. I don't think there is any way you're going to 
get there. And as a result I still don't think there's 
enough to go below the standard of probable cause but as 
3 
1 the case which we cited in our memorandum suggests, you 
2 ought to be applying a directed verdict standard. I don't 
3 think the evidence at the preliminary hearing is going to 
4 survive a directed verdict. And that's the nutshell 
5 version of why we think that the motion to quash ought to 
6 be granted and we'll respond to what the State has to say. 
7 THE COURT: Okay. 
8 Mr. Mercer? 
9 MR. MERCER: Well, your Honor, the Court's role 
10 today is not to substituted its judgment for that of Judge 
11 Fratto, (inaudible) magistrate but rather the (inaudible) 
12 Judge Fratto used his discretion finding probably cause in 
13 this case. I don't know that there's a lot of distinction 
14 because the burden for which he used is to view that in the 
15 light most favorable to the State and find that evidence is 
16 capable of inferences which support the State's claim the 
17 Jeff Reed was involved in the operation of an 
18 methamphetamine - -
19 THE COURT: Yeah, I know and you've listed some 
20 stuff so let's go through that, okay. 
21 MR. MERCER: All right. 
22 THE COURT: Because this is the trouble in part 
23 to me. Okay. He does make an admission that he knew that 
24 there was something going on downstairs. I think that's, 
25 so, I can deal with that. He admitted knowledge of the 
method used to produce methamphetamine. My response to 
that is so what? We're talking about a charge that 
involves specific activity in this home; production of 
methamphetamine. What does that have to do with anything? 
MR. MERCER: Well, you Honor, he's charged as a 
party so he doesn't have to be the principle in operating 
that lab. He has to — 
THE COURT: Yeah, but I don't have any evidence 
that he was a party. 
MR. MERCER: Well, — 
THE COURT: Based on the preliminary hearing. 
MR. MERCER: He's processing matchbooks to obtain 
phosphorous. He's processing —-
THE COURT: That was thrown away. 
MR. MERCER: I'm sorry? 
THE COURT: Wasn't that thrown away? I think 
that was thrown out. They were trying to set up her 
husband or something. That's the story I read in that 
preliminary hearing. 
MR. MERCER: A — 
THE COURT: They put a bunch of stuff in a bowl 
and they were trying to cook up some deal to set up her 
former husband or something like that. 
MR. MERCER: But, your Honor, regarding Ms. 
Petersen's claim that she knows that Jeff wasn't involved. 
5 
1 She claims to have not had any knowledge of the latter. 
2 And it seems — 
3 THE COURT: Well, so what? 
4 MR* MERCER: And she, if she doesn't know — 
5 THE COURT: It was her home — 
6 MR. MERCER: - - her house how can she be taken 
7 as having knowledge of whether or not this person had 
8 participation — 
9 THE COURT: Well, then, wherefs the connection? 
10 I mean I don't have any evidence that connects him to 
11 anything other than the fact that you list off a bunch a 
12 stuff. Admitted knowledge of the method used to produce 
13 methamphetamine. That has nothing to do with the charge 
14 that I can see. That the defendant admitted patronizing a 
15 chemistry store. I don't know that that has anything to do 
16 with the production of methamphetamine as charged. That 
17 the defendant admitted to Carol Petersen that he was 
18 involved in the production of methamphetamine and I read 
19 that testimony and she said, xxYeah, he told me he'd done it 
20 and I don't know where". And so on and so forth. It had 
21 nothing to do with the production going on in her home. 
22 That the defendant told Carol Petersen that he planned to 
23 manufacture methamphetamine. Well, maybe he planned to but 
24 what does that have to do with the charge pending? He 
25 planned to — 
MR. MERCER: I — 
THE COURT: - - wait a minute, let me finish. 
This is your memo. He planned to procure iodine and she 
accompanied him when he bought some pseudoephedrine. So 
what? Number six, Carol Petersen saw the defendant process 
pseudoephedrine. Okay. I read that. And she saw the 
defendant process matchbooks to obtain phosphorus. That 
was upstairs and things were going. And she was talking 
about setting up her husband because she was mad at her 
husband for some reason. I read that. 
Now, how does that connect him with, and I'd like 
to give you all the rope you need but I think Mr. Shapiro 
makes a point. And I don't know that I have to find that 
there was an abuse of discretion. I just have to take a 
look at the evidence and say, well, maybe, maybe Judge 
Fratto was mistaken in his approach. I don't know. But 
the charge is that at 7377 South 2290 West in Salt Lake 
County on or about December 16 Mr. Reed was a party to this 
plan lab operation. Where's the proof? 
MR. MERCER: At this stage of the proceedings the 
State doesn't have to have proof. The State simply has to 
have — 
THE COURT: No, you have to - -
MR. MERCER: - - evidence in which - -
THE COURT: You have to come close. And I don't 
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even think you're close. 
MR. MERCER: Well, your Honor, — 
THE COURT: You caught the guy in the house. 
MR. MERCER: Are you going to want me to argue? 
THE COURT: No, Mr. Mercer, look. Don't give me 
this crap. Please don't. I'll let you make your record, 
okay? But you're not answering the questions. 
MR. MERCER: You won't allow me to. You keep 
speaking every time that I speak. 
THE COURT: Well, I know because I can't quite 
figure out where you're coming from. 
MR. MERCER: Well, first of all. I didn't do the 
preliminary examination. So, I'm working from the same 
transcripts that you are. 
THE COURT: All right. Let's take it one at a 
time. 
MR. MERCER: The legal standard is is there a 
reasonable inference that can be drawn from, the evidence 
viewed in the light most favorable to the State? What we 
have is a defendant who holds himself out as a 
methamphetamine cook. We have a lab located in a house 
that he is claiming as his residence. We have him bringing 
to that house ephedrine and processing that in the method 
necessary to reduce it to a substance used to make 
methamphetamine in the same house where the clandestine lab 
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1 is found. I submit that that alone is sufficient to find 
2 probable cause to warrant this case going to trial. 
3 MR. SHAPIRO: Judge, in response to that, the 
4 record is clear from the police officer's testimony that 
5 there numerous laboratory items or alleged laboratory items 
6 that were found in the basement of the home. Setting aside 
7 for a second that the basement of the home was raided after 
8 two people who for some reason or another weren't ever 
9 charged in this case, the laboratory items, according to 
10 the officer in criminal investigations department, 
11 testimony there are no fingerprints that are found on those 
12 items which would link to Mr. Reed. 
13 Now the number of items, there are, let's see, 
14 cookware, numerous flasks, tapes, bottles, a heating 
15 device, a condenser column, storage jars, funnels, a frying 
16 pan and other containers. All of which they allege are 
17 part of the lab operation. Now, I think that if the State 
18 is going to move forward on this case, especially on the 
19 unusual facts, they need to find some link between Mr. Reed 
20 and some of those items. They don't find a single 
21 fingerprint that they're able to testify to on any of those 
22 items. They don't find Mr. Reed in the presence of the 
23 basement where the lab was set up and, again, based on the 
24 (inaudible) two people who for some reason or another are 
25 uncharged. They're the State's principle witness, they're 
immunized as the witness that they offer this tremendous 
plea bargain offer to stands up and says she doesn't know 
Jeff to be involved in this operation and she does so at 
the risk of losing her opportunity to go to drug court and 
then going back and facing mandatory five year to life 
prison sentence for her involvement in this operation. 
Notwithstanding all that the deal that she's offered is you 
need to tell the truth. She gets up on the stand and 
that's what she says. I think that we have to give her 
some credibility under the circumstances. It's her home. 
She has everything she needs in order to put the blame of 
Jeff and stay away from it and she doesn't do that. I 
think we have to give her credit for being truthful in her 
testimony. 
Again, I wish you'd agree with Mr. Mercer's 
position about the Court's role. I think the Talbot case 
is clear that you're a gate keeper on this case and it's 
going to be your case if you don't quash the bind over. 
We're going to try this case and defend it and there isn't 
any suggestion to me evidence which contradicts that which 
was at the preliminary hearing. There is not any link 
between Mr. Reed and the involvement at that location on 
the time that's charged and the Talbot case is clear. 
There has to be probable case as to each and every element 
of the terms of defense. I think the State misses their 
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burden there. 
THE COURT: Well, I like to make some 
observations. I did read through this transcript and on 
page 54 the question is, "And your believe, and your belief 
is that my client was not involved in any way in the 
operation of that lab; is that correct?" 
Answer, "Correct". 
"In fact, you told the officer that you had 
rented the downstairs or a portion of the downstairs to two 
individuals; is that correct?" 
"Correct". 
And thatfs where we get into the Jay and Lisa 
deal. 
Then on page 56, "Do you have any knowledge that 
he, Jeff, was involved with the lab, that or the lab 
materials that were found in the basement?" 
Answer: "I do not have any knowledge or know that 
he had any of the stuff that was in my basement." 
"In fact he never told you that he was involved 
with the lab at that address; is that right?" 
Answer: "Not at the address, no." 
Question: "Did he tell you specifically he was 
involved in other production?" 
Answer: "He kept talking about wanting to throw a 
big batch and that was as far as that conversation went." 
11 
1 I've dealt with the case in (inaudible). 
2 And then in talking about the stuff that they 
3 were trying to cook up with the striker plates and that on 
4 page 61. Actually, it begins on 60. "So, even though you 
5 saw him put pseudoephedrine in a ball and add the solvent 
6 and then playing around with striker plates, your 
7 understand is that that material was never used for 
8 operation of a methamphetamine lab, right? 
9 Answer: "It never made it to a lab, no." 
10 Question: "In fact, it was flushed down a 
11 toilet, correct? 
12 Answer: "Correct." 
13 Question: "And you were there when it was 
14. flushed?" 
15 Answer: "The matchbooks went out in the garbage 
16 so I mean I don't — and as far as the pseudoephedrine, I 
17 can't tell you exactly when that was and I don't know what 
18 happened to the pseudoephedrine. 
19 "But there is truth to the story about you trying 
20 to set up — set your husband up? 
21 "Yes." 
22 I don't see a connection, the motion is granted. 
23 MR. SHAPIRO: Assume I should prepare an order 
24 for the Court's signature. 
25 THE COURT: If you would, please. 
12 
Mr. Mercer, I apologize for interrupting you. 
That was not fair. 
(Whereupon the proceedings were concluded.) 
CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing transcript 
in the before mentioned hearing held before Judge William 
W. Barrett was transcribed by me from videotapes and 
and is a full, true and correct transcription of the 
proceedings as set forth in the preceding pages to the best 
of my ability. 
Signed this 1st day of December, 1999 in 
Sandy, Utah. 
Carolyn Jtrickson 
Certified Shorthand Reporter 
Certified Court Transcriber 
My Commission expires May 4, 2002 
NOTARY Pl.TUC 
CAROLYN ERICKSON 
652 Jefferson Cove 
Sand/, UT 84070 
My Commission Expires 
May 4th, 2002 
STATE OF UTAH 
